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INTRODUCTION
A fi rm's decision to evade taxes may be separable from its activity choice. This separability feature has important implications since, for example, the neutrality of a profi t tax is preserved in the presence of tax evasion opportunities. Synthesizing previous analyses, Yaniv (1995) establishes the conditions that guarantee that a fi rm's input or output choices are independent of its evasion decision. There are a number of settings, however, in which the separability feature may not hold. First, this will be the case if the fi rm cannot attain its preferred extent of tax evasion and its choice variable is the fraction of the tax base declared, instead of the absolute amount (Kreutzer and Lee, 1986; Wang and Conant, 1988; Yaniv, 1995 Yaniv, , 1996 . Activity and evasion choices may not be separable either if, second, the extent of tax evasion exerts a direct negative effect on gross profi ts (Kreutzer and Lee, 1988; Virmani, 1989) or, third, the detection probability and/or the penalty rate are determined endogenously by, e.g., the fi rm's reported revenues or costs (Marelli, 1984; Marelli and Martina, 1988; Virmani, 1989; Lee, 1998) . Finally, separability will not hold if the uncertainty caused by tax evasion is complemented by a second source of uncertainty regarding either the outcome of the fi rm's activity (Yaniv, 1995) or the investment decision (Panteghini, 2000) .
All of the above contributions take the market structure as given. However, tax evasion occurs because fi rms are better off when misreporting than when telling the truth to tax authorities. Hence, tax evasion affects the fi rms' payoffs and the gains from entering the market. The innovation of our analysis is to endogenize the market structure. We rule out all causes for a non-separability of output and evasion choices established thus far, and develop a Cournot oligopoly model with profi t tax evasion and an endogenous number of fi rms.
1 Prior to the decisions about the activity level and the amount of profi t tax evasion, fi rms choose whether to enter the market at positive costs. We can show that tax evasion infl uences the production level of each fi rm and alters aggregate output. The reason is that, under a given market structure, tax evasion enhances the expected payoff of each fi rm. This increase will attract new fi rms. As a consequence, output of the incumbent fi rms falls. The additional output of the new fi rms outweighs the decline in the production of the fi rms already in the market so that aggregate output increases. In sum, we identify the endogeneity of the market structure as a further reason why profi t tax evasion affects individual and aggregate production. Hence, under oligopoly with endogenous market structure, profi t taxes will not be neutral and we shall argue below that tax evasion will tend to render the market structure less effi cient.
MODEL AND RESULTS
Consider an industry with a continuum of potential fi rms that will produce a homogeneous good once they have entered the market. To ensure that non-marginal fi rms have positive gross profi ts in equilibrium and an incentive to evade a tax on profi ts, fi rms are assumed to differ in production costs. A fi rm of type θ has costs C(x, θ), given a production quantity of x units, with C x > 0 and C xx ≥ 0. Moreover, we assume C(0, θ 1 ) ≥ C(0, θ 2 ) for θ 1 > θ 2 and C xθ ≥ 0, with strict inequality in at least one of these two conditions. Hence, a fi rm with a large θ has higher fi xed and/or higher marginal production costs than a fi rm with a small θ. Note that these conditions imply C θ > 0. The cost parameter θ is continuously distributed over the interval [θ, θ − ]with θ < θ − , according to the distribution function F(θ) and the density function f(θ) = dF(θ)/dθ. Without loss of generality, the mass of fi rms is normalized to unity. A fi rm makes three decisions at most. First, it decides whether to enter the market at costs k. If it enters, it will subsequently select output and the extent of tax evasion. To ensure a subgame perfect solution, we start with the latter decisions and take market entry as given, so that entry costs k are sunk. Consider a fi rm of type θ and assume that this fi rm produces an output of x in the second stage. Let x -be the output of all other fi rms operating in the market. Aggregate output is y := x + x -, and P(y) with P' < 0 defi nes the inverse demand function. We focus on the most relevant case of strategic substitutes defi ned in Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) . Marginal profits of any one firm will then decrease with the output of the fi rm's rivals. Formally we have P' + xP'' < 0. This implies 2P' + xP'' -C xx < 0, which is a well-known necessary condition for the stability of the equilibrium in oligopoly models (Dixit, 1986) .
Each fi rm has to pay a profi t tax at rate τ. The tax base of fi rm θ is
The fi rm can evade taxes by understating profi ts. Let s be the absolute amount of understatement. The tax authority audits firms with an exogenous probability q, and if a fi rm is audited, tax evasion will be detected with certainty. In this case, the fi rm has to pay the full amount of taxes due and a penalty that is proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. The penalty rate is exogenous and denoted by δ > 0. After-tax profi ts of the fi rm will equal 1 Virmani (1989) also considers a model with (free) entry of fi rms. However, since the output market is always perfectly competitive, the market structure is effectively exogenous.
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if tax evasion remains undetected, and
if the tax authority catches the fi rm evading taxes. In line with most of the literature referred to in the introduction, a fi rm is assumed to maximize the expected utility of profi ts. It has an increasing and strictly concave utility function U. 2 Without loss of generality, we normalize the reservation utility, i.e., the utility resulting from not entering the market and producing a quantity of zero, to U(0) = 0. Expected utility of the fi rm, taken entry as given, reads
For a given market structure, the fi rm maximizes [4] with respect to output and evasion, taking into account
. Supposing an interior solution, which implies q < 1/(1 + δ), and denoting optimal values by an asterisk, the fi rst-order conditions can be written as
states that expected marginal benefi ts from tax evasion equal expected marginal costs in terms of the utility loss caused by the penalty. According to [6] , marginal revenues just offset marginal production costs. This condition for the fi rm's optimal output is the same as the respective requirement in the absence of tax evasion. More specifi cally, output does not depend on the evasion variable s and the tax enforcement parameters q and δ. For a given market structure, therefore, the separability property derived in earlier contributions holds. However, this property does not necessarily imply that the fi rms' output is not affected by tax evasion. As we will now show, endogenizing the market structure creates a link between output and the extent of tax evasion.
From equations [5] and [6] , the optimal amount of tax evasion s* can be written as a function of the cost parameter θ, aggregate output y and the detection probability q, i.e., s* = S(θ, y, q), while, due to the separability property, the optimal output level x* depends solely on the cost parameter θ and aggregate output y, i.e., x* = X(θ, y). 
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According to [7] , low-costs fi rms have a higher output than high-costs firms and an increase in aggregate production reduces the fi rm's output. The latter property is due to our assumption of strategic substitutes. Inserting x* = X(θ, y) and s* = S(θ, y, q) into [4] defi nes the maximum expected utility EU*(θ, y, q) of the fi rm, provided it enters the market. Differentiating EU*(θ, y, q) with respect to the cost parameter θ, for a given aggregate output level y, and taking into account
Hence, the maximum expected utility is a decreasing function of θ so that, for any given aggregate output y, high-costs fi rms have lower expected utility than low-costs fi rms. This property allows us to formalize the market entry decision in the first stage and, thus, to determine the overall equilibrium of the oligopoly game. A fi rm of type θ will enter if the maximum expected utility resulting from entry, EU*(θ, y, q), is not less than the reservation utility U(0) = 0 of abstaining from such an action. Let θ* be the cost parameter of the marginal fi rm, i.e., of the fi rm that obtains an expected utility equal to the reservation utility and that, accordingly, is just indifferent between entering and not entering. Suppose, further, that all fi rms with a cost parameter θ ∈ [θ,θ*] enter the market, while the remaining fi rms do not. Expected utility of the marginal fi rm and aggregate output can then be written as Having established a unique equilibrium of the oligopoly game, a comparative static analysis clarifi es the impact of tax evasion on aggregate output y* and output per fi rm x* = X(θ, y*). Note that [9] and [10] defi ne the marginal fi rm θ* and aggregate output y* as functions of the detection probability q, and that our model includes a world without evasion as a special case for q ≥ 1/(1 + δ). Thus, a decrease in q, starting from a value of q = 1/(1 + δ), simulates the transition from a world without tax evasion to a world in which evasion becomes profi table. Totally differentiating [9] and [10] yields
With respect to the output of a non-mar- They show that profi t tax evasion will have an impact on output if the market structure is endogenous. According to equation [12] , aggregate output is increased by tax evasion, while [13] implies that the output of each fi rm operating in the market will be reduced. The intuition is as follows: for a given market structure, tax evasion increases expected utility of all fi rms. As a consequence, the marginal fi rm in the absence of tax evasion will have a positive expected utility level if evasion becomes feasible. Moreover, there are firms whose expected utility from entry into the market has been negative without tax evasion but becomes at least zero in the presence of evasion activities. These fi rms enter the market. Formally, θ* rises and the (new) marginal fi rm is characterized by a higher cost parameter according to [11] . Hence, tax evasion attracts new fi rms. The output of these new fi rms reduces output of the incumbents due to our assumption of strategic substitutes. But the additional production of the new fi rms more than compensates the reduction in the incumbents' output so that aggregate output is enhanced by tax evasion. These effects of tax evasion on the fi rms' output are indirect. A change in the probability of being detected evading taxes does not affect the fi rst-order condition [6] of the fi rm with respect to output. Instead, tax evasion changes the market structure and so induces the fi rms to adjust their output levels. This is the reason why, for a given market structure, we obtain the same separability result as the analyses referred to in the Introduction. But none of the previous contributions considers the case of an endogenous market structure. In contrast, we show that with an endogenous market structure, tax evasion infl uences output by changes in the number of fi rms and, in this sense, evasion and output decisions are no longer separable.
The non-separability result has important implications for the neutrality of profi t taxes. One of the main motivations of previous studies to investigate the relation between tax evasion and activity choices was the question whether a profi t tax can be used to induce a monopolist to increase its ineffi ciently low output. Those authors who obtain the separability property conclude that the conventional neutrality of a profi t tax is true even in the presence of tax evasion, while authors disproving separability argue that under tax evasion a profi t tax is no longer neutral. In our framework, we can raise a similar question. It is well known from the analysis by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) that unrestricted entry in a Cournot oligopoly with positive entry costs induces an ineffi ciently large number of fi rms and aggregate output, relatively to a second-best world in which the number of fi rms, but not the output per fi rm, can be regulated. 4 The reason is that the marginal entrant ignores that the incumbents' output and profi t levels are reduced by her entry. Thus, we may ask whether a profi t tax is suitable to internalize this externality and which role tax evasion plays.
To answer this question, initially consider the case without tax evasion (q ≥ 1/(1 + δ)). The profi t tax is then neutral because the market entry condition [9] reduces to x*P(·) -C(·) -k = 0. Hence, the profit tax alters neither the firms' output decisions, as characterized by [6] , nor the marginal fi rm. In the presence of tax evasion, by contrast, the nonseparability result derived above invalidates the neutrality of the profit tax because the firms' incentives to enter the market are changed. The number of fi rms and aggregate output are increased further since evasion raises profi ts and leads to additional entry. Hence, an evadable profi t tax is likely to aggravate the inefficiency derived by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) instead of removing it.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Extending previous studies to the case of an endogenous market structure, this paper proves that profi t tax evasion may infl uence the activity levels of fi rms. In our setting, tax evasion increases the expected payoff from production so that more fi rms fi nd it profi table to enter the market. Aggregate supply in the whole market rises since the increase in the number of fi rms more than compensates the reduction in output per fi rm. Finally, we would like to emphasize that the main rationale of our argument is also true in a more general setting comprising other types of imperfect competition and taxes. To see this, we can use a similar approach as Yaniv (1995) . Analogous to his equation [1] , defi ne fi rm θ's legitimate net profi ts (i.e., net profi ts if this fi rm fully complies to the tax law) as G(x 1 , x 2 ,…,x θ ,…, x n , θ, k, τ), where x i is the activity level of fi rm i (for heuristic reasons we now assume a discrete fi rm space), τ may be any kind of tax (not necessarily a profi t tax) and all other variables have the same meaning as in our Cournot model. If the term (1 -τ)Π in [2] and [3] is now replaced by G, fi rm θ's optimal activity level is determined by ∂G(x 1 , x 2 ,…, x θ ,…, x n , θ, k, τ)/∂x θ = 0. This is the same condition as in the absence of tax evasion and, thus, for a given market structure, we would obtain the same separability result as Yaniv (1995) . But with an endogenous market structure, tax evasion infl uences market entry and the dimension of the vector (x 1 , x 2 ,…, x θ ,…, x n ). This, in turn, changes the individual fi rm's activity level and invalidates the separability result. It will be an interesting task for future research to investigate the economic consequences of this non-separability for other taxes, such as value-added or emission taxes, and other types of competition such as Bertrand competition or product differentiation.
